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1,N THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
If. GRANT JOHNSON and HELEN
.JOHNSON, his 'vife,
Plaintiffs aind Appellants,

I

c~\JNTY.

Case No.

SAl/11 LAKE
COTTON- )
·wooD SANITARY DISTRICT
Defendant and Respondent.

11077

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for property damage sustained by
the plaintiff when sewage backed up defendant's lines
into plaintiffs' basement.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
RPspondent seeks affirmance of the lower court.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs are homeowners in Cottonwood, an unincorporated area of Salt Lake County. To provide residents of this fast-growing arPa with essential sanitary
service on a community basis instead of allowing an obviously unhealthful proliferation of individual septic tanks,
8alt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District was
organized according to thP statutory dPsign set forth
in rritle 17, Chapt0r G, Utah Code Annotated. On March
15, 19GG, plaintiffs' basenwnt was flooded "\Yith se>wagP
hael~ing from defendant's line-s.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging negligence
and stating as a conclusion without pleading supporting
facts "said event constitutes a breach of the contract
between plaintiff and defendant" (R-1, 3). Defendant
moved to dismiss before answer and the motion was heard
at pretrial and again before trial.
ARGU:l\fENT
POINT I
SEWER DISTRICTS ARE GOVERNMENT AL ENTITIES
PERFORMING A GOVERNl\IENT AL FUNCTION AND ARE
ENTITLED TO GOVERNl\IENTAL IMMUNITY FOR ACTS
OF NEGLIGENCE.

3

Assuming for purposes of this appeal that defendant
was negligent which negligence caused the damage to
plaintiffs' home, as a governmental agency performing
a necessary municipal function it is not liable for acts
of simple negligence. As this Court recently decided in
ColJia v. Roy City, 12 U. 2<l 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961):
Our concern is whether an incorporated city
is liable for damage resulting from a sewer stoppage on a theory of (1) negligence or (2) nuisance,
in an isolated ease, where the question pointed
up is whether operation of a sewer is governmental or provrietary. endf'r the facts of this
case, and because of what we have said bt'fore, we
think the result is the same whether it is urged
on negligence or nuisance grounds. We express
no opinion as to a situation where the condition
is oine resulting in continuing damage.
Utah constantly has adhered to the principle
of governmental immunity where the sovereign
has been attacked on account of injury to property, which principlr has been applied to state
activity or that of its agencies, such .as school
f;oards, cities, counties, the highway department,
and thr like.
It is recognized that there is but one Utah
case having to do with sewers, which was decided
before statehood (1892) (Kiesel v. Ogden City, 8
Ptah 237, :30 P. 758) \Yhich determined that the
operation of a sewer was actionable against the
city if neglig1'nc1' was shown to exist. So far as
th~t casP is inconsistent with what is said here, it
is revenwd, particularly since that case predated
onr state sovereignty, our Constitution and subse-
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quent legislation that gave new breadth and immunity to state agencies, except where specifieally waived.
It seems to us that the operation of a sewer
more nearly is governmentally charged tha:n arc
most or all of. those situations we have reviewed '
as reflected in the cases Just nientioned. To e.rcliide the operntion of sewers from, this field reasonably woitld seem un_justifiable in logic or
otherwisr. To do so would do violence to our
concept of s(•paration of powers, we believe. WP
have left to the Constitution and legislature tlw
matter of waivt->r of immunity in such cast's. (Emphasis add Pd.)

The Court, continuing, reaffirmed its definition of a
governmental function as relating to the nature of the
activity: "It must be something done or furnished for
the public good." The supplemental tests are: " (a.)
whether there is special pecuniary benefit or profit to the
city and (b) whether the activity is of such a nature as to
be in rei,.al rompetition with free enterprise."
From the Cobia holding, it is apparent that, were
defendant a municipality, plaintiffs' claim in negligence
would be barred. But plaintiffs assert that this Court
has refused to t~xtend the doctrine to special improvement
districts, relying upon N estman v. South Davis County
Water Improvement District, 16 U. 2d 198, 398 P. 2d
203 ( 19fiil). 'J1hat case, howevPr, involved a function
which has always been lwld to he proprietary in nature
in this statP-orwrating a water system.

5

The Court in N estman expressly made this distinction saying:
Quite apart from the fact just noted above,
that the defendant ·water District is of somewhat
different character than the governmental entities
to which sovereign immunity has been applied,
there is a more important and controlling reason
\\'hy the District is not "'ntitled to that protection.
\Vlwre a public body, which would otherwise be
entitlPd to sov(:'reign immunity, Pngages in an aetivity of a tommereial or proprietary charactPr,
the prot(-letion doPs not (-'Xist. Specifically, we
have held that wh<•n a city carries on th"' business
of operating a water system and supplying watPr
for fees, it is a proprietary function, amd the city
is liable for damage or injury caused by its negligence in connection therewith; and that the same
is true of irrigation companies. Inasmuch as this
activity is a proprietary one when carried on by
a city, it could not very well be deemed otherwise
when carried on by the defendant Water District.

* * *

It would indeed be anomolous and unjust if
the inhabitants of an area could operate such a
project under sovereign immunity by forming a
district, \\"hereas, if the same area, or a comparable one, incorporated as a city, and carried on. the
same 1activity. it would b"' without such protection.
(Emphasis add(:'d.)
rrhe prPS(:'nt case is the reverse of this com. If it

wonld h"' anomalous and unjust to give an improvement
<listrict an immunity not enjoyed by municipalities performinir,..., the same function, it vrnuld bP equally anomalous

and unjust to deny a district immunity for performing
a function protected when performed by a municipality.
Other jurisdictions where sewage disposal is considered a governmental function have made no distinction
between sewage disposal provided by municipal corporations and that provided by improvement districts. Page
v. Metropolitan St. Louis Srwer District, (Mo., 1964)
337 S.W. 2d 348; Faidntsh v. Louisville and J efferso11
County Afrtropolitan Se1cer District, (Ky., 1951) 240
8.W. 2d 622; Sinclair Pipe L?.ne Co. v. Dipscomb ( Tt>x.
Civ. App., 1957) :-ms ~. W. 2d 58+; Beck v. Boh Bros.
Co1ist. Co., (La., 195-l:) 72 So. 2d 7G5; Gnau v. Louisi;illc
and Jefferson Cownty Metropolitan Sewer District, (Ky.,

1961) 346

s.w. 2d 754.

In the Gnau case, supra, the trial court dismissed the
action, holding that it had no jurisdiction over the defendant because of governmental immunity. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed saying:
The sewer district is an independent public
corporation, autonomous and self-sustaining, and
... is performing a governmental function in the
preservation and promotion of public health. vVP
rer.ognized (in Fmrlmsh) that the SP'Ner District
is an agency of the ~~tate and thus cloaked with immunity from liability for injury occasioned by
negligPnt ads of its servants.
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Leiading writers in the field uphold this reasoning.
As stated in 18 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (1963
Ed.), 111-122 Sec. 53.05 (Immunity of Quasi-Municipal
Corporations) :
It is pertinent to here state that there is a
distinction between municipal corporations proper
and quasi-municipal corporations concerning liahility for torts, and that the general rule is that
the latter are not liable for torts unless so provided by statutPs.

rrhe immunity from liability of quasi-public
corporations is generally placed upon the ground
of their involuntary and public character. They
are usually treated as public or state agencies,
and their duties are ordinarily wholly governmental. They exercise the greater part of their
functions as agencies of the state merely, and are
created for purposes of public policy.
Under exceptional circumstances, however, at
least in some states, counties, towns and similar
organizations, have been held liable for torts.
Thus, liability has been imposed where the tort
was connected with an undertaking conducted in
part at least for profit, or which was in the nature
of a propriPtary activity.
Although the authorities are by no means uniform, the rule of immunity above referred to, has
hePn applied to a wide variety of governmental
and political organizations, including drainage
districts, flood control districts, utility districts,
improvenwnt districts, ... and of eourse, counties.
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Appellants assert there was a waiver of immunity
by use of the words "sue and be sued" in the enabling
statute. (Brief p. 4). These words do not imply a waiver
of immunity. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, sitpra. In Bi ngham v. Boa.rd of Education, 118
Utah 582, 223 P.2d 4:32 (1950) this Court was asked to
construct 1a similarly wordPd statute rPading:
1

The hoard of education of <:>very school ch;trict shall be a bod-"- eorporate ... may sue and
be sued, and may take, hold, lease, sell and coffVl')'
real and pPrsonal property as the interests of the
schools may require. Utah Code Annotated (1953)
53-4-8. (Emphasis added.)
In that case the board of education was held immune
from suit for negligence. See also Campbell v. Pack, 13
U.2d 161, 389 P.2d 464 ( 1964). School districts, although
not municipal corporations, an~ among the govPrnrnent
agencies and bodiP.s which hav{• lwretofore hepn accorded
immunity. Then• are many similarities hetwec•n school
boards and special irnprovt-ment di::-;tricts in their statutory authorty, organization, financing and administration.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFFS' COl\fPLAINT DID NOT STATE A
SEPARATE CLAIM IN CONTRACT.

Plaintiffs' hrie>f indicat<-'H a rPlianeP upon a eonfra('t
to support rec·owry. (BriPf, p. :2). Contrnn- to nppel-

lants' assertion, it has not been stipulated that a contract
between plaintiffs and defendant exists. From the wording of the Pretrial Order, it is clear the Court and counsel
understood that a ruling that defendant is entitled to
sovereign immunity would be dispositive of the case.
Although defendant does not assert that it would be
immune for breach of contract, the trial court properly
Jisregarded the characterization of this claim as a breach
of contrac,t in an attempt to circumvent the doctrine of
governmental immunity.
l>laintiffs alleged in their Complaint:
Defendant permitted the sewage out of its
gathering lines ... which said event ... would not
occur if the defendant operated its sewer coll~
tion . . . in a reasonably careful and ordinary
manner, and said event constitutes a breach of the
contract between plaintiff and defendant to collect
and carry away from their home sewage ... (R. 2).
(Emphasis added.)
The essential nature of the action is a tort. Had defendant refused to pay a bill for pipe a different case would
he presented. Here the alleged breach was of a duty
imposed by law, not contract.
The pleading in this case is similar to that in Lindsay
1'.

Woodu:ard, 5 lT. 2d 183, 299 P.2d 619 (1956), which
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involved a counterclaim in malpractice. Breach of an implied agreement arising out of the relationship was alleged to circumvent the shorter tort statute of limitations.
Applying Idaho law, this court found against the patient,
relying upon Triniming v. Hou1arrl, 52 Ida. 412, 16 P. 2<l
661. In the Trimming case a physician allegedly brokP
and negligently failed to remove a hypodermic nPedlP
which had been inserted into plaintiff':-; spinal column
during trPatrnPnt for spinal rnpningiti:-;. 1.'he Complaint
stated:
The defendant was guilty of gross negligence
and carelessnPss and failed to exercise ordinary
care and common prudence ... and in violation
of the contractital duty ... to skillfully ,and carefully treat the plaintiff and remove said needle
from his back and in breach of the duty by reason
of the defendant's profession and the contractual
relationship . . . in that the said deft~ndant has
grossly, negligently and carelessly left in plaintiff's hack a portion of said broken needle approximately three-fourths of an ineh in length.
The Idaho Ruprt>me Court stat(•d:
1.'his ea:-;e is prPsented to th<• court upon two

thPories, a1ipellant eontending tliat it i:-; one on
contract, colort>d with recently discovered fraud
and concealment, tolling thP statutes of limitation, and l'PSpondent is insistpntl:-- cont0ncling tkit
it is a casP of malpraetisP, sonncling in tort, and
tlwn•fore harn•d hy C. N. ~~Pdion (iG12, suhd. -L
Tlw complaint primarily nllf'!-',"<'S that a contract
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f ?r treatment was entered into between the parb es. So far so good. But, in the performance of
that contract, respondent impliedly contracted
that he would exercise ordinary and reasonable
care, the which is 'another way of saying that such
duty is imposed by law.
* * *
Wt' do not ltave to deal here with a contract
·whereby the surgeon expressly undertook to use
extraordinary skill and care. Tha,t being out of
the u:ay, the charging parts of the complaint will
determine tchether or not the grffvamen of this
action consists of a. ln-e(lrh of the contract, itself,
or the dirty impnsed hy lnw in relation to thP manner of its peformance. Aside from the one allegation of fraud and concealment, the basic allegations of the complaint a.re directed solely to carelessness, negligence, and misconduct as the pr.oximate caiise of the injiiry claimed to have been
suffered. Respondent is not arraigned for breach
of contract, but for delinquencies incidental to
its performance. As alleged, these are the very
foundation of the action, and, if true, constituted
nothing lmt malpractise. The gist of a malpractise
action is nPgligence, not a breach of the contract
of employment. ThP origina,z injury, be it caused
by carelessness, negligence, misconditet, or whatnot, remains the sole cause of a.ction; and the
action is one ·in tort a nd not for a breach of contract. The appropriate statute of limitations is
determined by the substance, not the form, of the
action. \Ve hold, th1:.•rt>fore, that the instant case
based upon a cause of action sounding in tort is
plainly a ;-;nit for malprartise. (Emphasis added.)
1

12
Ree also, T,wylor Bros. Co. v. Duden,, 112 1Ttiah 436, 188
P.2d 995 (1948). In Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. LiP'scomb,
supra, the court disregarded the pleading of an unconstitutional taking by noting the nature of the claim asserted
waR negligffi'llce.
CONCLUSION
The defendant is a governmental agency performing
a governmental function with the support of itR statutory taxing power. That function does not become proprietary \vhen performed by other than a city any more
than this claim becomes one for breach of contract by
ealling it so.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
\\TORSLEY, 8NOW, &
CHRISTENSEN
Sc>venth Floor, Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant and

Responde11 t

